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Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V.
ANTHONY

V.

ALFIERI*

When there is no history there is no metaphor 1
INTRODUCTION

American lawyer traditions present rich opportunities for ethical inquiry.
Because of the breadth and diversity of those traditions, inquiry must be tailored to specific lawyer contexts and practices. This article will address the
context of poverty law and the ethical dimensions of practice in impoverished communities. My purpose is to augment the expanding body of literature rededicated to the study of poverty law by exploring the tension internal
2
to its distinctive practice.
From the outset, it is important to acknowledge that a number of notable
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Studies, Marquette University Law School;
A.B., Brown University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1984. I am grateful to
Marie Ashe, Robert Burdick, Naomi Cahn, Clark Cunningham, Phyllis Goldfarb, Peter Margulies,
Michael Perlin, Deborah Rhode, Paul Tremblay, Louise Trubek, and Ellen Barker Grant for their
commentary and support. I also wish to thank Anthony Dinota, Beverly Franklin, Jennifer Woods,
and the Marquette University Law School library staff for their research assistance.
This article is dedicated to the 96 students of my Professional Responsibility class for their spirited participation in role-playing, facilitation groups, and shared learning.
1. M. HARPER, Debridement, in IMAGES OF KIN: NEW AND SELECTED POEMS 69 (1977). The
full text of the poem is set forth below:
When there is no history
there is no metaphor;
a blind nation in storm
mauls its own harbors
spermwhale, Indian, Black,
belted in these ruins.
Id.
2. For examples of the resurgent literature, see Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under
Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985); Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L. J. 2105 (1991); Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty
Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88);
Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1984-85);
Failinger & May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1984); Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory and the
Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83); Luban, The Quality of Justice,
66 DENVER L. REV. 381 (1989); Sarat, ". . The Law Is All Over'" Power, Resistance, and the Legal
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J. L. AND HUMANITIES 343 (1990); Scheingold, The
Dilemma of Legal Services, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); White, Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs G., 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G.]; White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88) [hereinafter Making Space for Clients to
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efforts presage this investigation. 3 As a result of these efforts, we have acquired a greater understanding of the poverty lawyer's habits of thinking,
seeing, and speaking. What we have not learned, however, is the extent to
which the impoverished client perceives, and the manner in which she responds to, such ingrained habits. Does the client accept or contest lawyer
ways of thinking? Moreover, does the client embrace or diverge from lawyer
ways of speaking? In short, what is the form and substance of client
interpretation?
Even the most discerning studies of the lawyer-client relation in the context of poverty law are perplexed by the nature of the interpretive process.
Due to the complexity of that process, I will put forward a framework of
analysis tentative in both its premise and conclusions. The analysis is divided
into four parts. Part I introduces the notion of ethical lawyering. Part II
considers the rationality and discourse of lawyer storytelling, especially the
themes of resistance and suppression. Part III recounts the story of
Josephine V., an impoverished Hispanic woman, and her act of speaking out
of turn.4 Part IV advances an ethic of resistance.
I.

ETHICAL LAWYERING

The notion of ethical lawyering is culled from longstanding practices of
the poverty lawyer. 5 Historically fashioned by direct service and law reform
advocacy, the practices are unified by the concept of lawyer paternalism. 6 By
Speak]; White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis.
L. REV.699.
David Luban identifies human autonomy, self-reliance, and active political participation with a
poverty law practice based vision of client empowerment. Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DEN.
L. REV. 381, 413 (1989).
3. For literature addressing both theoretical and practical aspects of poverty law practice, see,
e.g., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY 188-197 (E. Dvorkin, J. Himmelstein & H. Cesnick eds. 1980); G. BELLOW & B.
MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 90-122
(1981); G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION

415-439 (2d ed. 1988); P. HEYMANN & L. LEIBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS:
CASE STUDIES 2-48 (1988); Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and
Fairness in PublicInterest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REV. 337 (1978); Tremblay, Toward a CommunityBased Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990).
4. Josephine V.'s full name, her daughter's name, associated institutional and witness references,
and certain historical facts will be withheld to protect matters of confidence and privacy. All other
matters pertaining to Mrs. V's story are discussed with her permission based on case notes, file
documents, and a state administrative hearing transcript.
5. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,supra
note 2.
6. For a discussion of lawyer paternalism, see Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Ellman, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 717 (1987); Lehman, The Pursuit of A Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979);
Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Professional, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454; Margulies, "Who Are You
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lawyer paternalism, I mean the lawyer's willingness and ability to dominate
the rationality and discourse of the lawyer-client relation. 7 Rationality is defined by structures of thinking and seeing which shape the content of the
lawyer's vision of the client and the form of legal advocacy. Discourse is
denoted by structures of speech and non-speech which invite or silence client
participation in legal advocacy."
to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client DeliberationRegarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interest of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L. REV. 213 (1990); Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1083 (1988); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics, 1978
WIs. L. REV. 29; Spiegel, The New Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Lawyer-Client Decision
Making and the Role of Rules in Structuringthe Lawyer-ClientDialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 1003; Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979); Tremblay, On Persuasionand Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking
and the Questionably Competent Client, 3 UTAH L. REV. 515 (1987).
7. Recent theoretical study and empirical research suggest significant distinctions in the degree of
dominance exhibited in various practice settings. Noteworthy findings report a greater degree of
dominance, for example, in poverty practice than in corporate or general practice, though perhaps
not in matrimonial practice. See, e.g., J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 336, 361-73 (1982) ("[L]awyers doing high prestige work are less likely to
define their clients' problems than are lawyers doing lower status work."); D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?

(1974) (contrasting traditional and participatory models of

lawyering in terms of client dependence and collaboration); Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers,
68 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1988) (examining conditions of lawyer professional independence from client
interests); Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REV. 891, 899 (1983) ("[I]n the personal client
sector the lawyers will be in a much stronger position to define the clients' needs and to determine
the manner in which those needs are met ....");Hosticka, We Don't CareAbout What Happened,
We Only Care About What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc.
PROBS. 599 (1979) (describing power relationships between legal services attorneys and their clients); Kritzer, The Dimensions of Lawyer-Client Relations: Notes Toward a Theory and a Field
Study, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 409, 412 (documenting a broad measure of professional autonomy encompassing the multifaceted ability to control lawyer-client interaction, define the nature of
legal problems, identify tasks, and dictate the means of accomplishing such tasks); Menkel-Meadow
& Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Services: IndividualAttorney Decisions in Work Priorities,
5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 237 (1983) (finding professional, rather than client, dominance of attorney
resource allocation among legal services attorneys); Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional
Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503
(1985) (analyzing the ideology of large-firm lawyers and their behavior toward their clients); Sarat
& Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE
L.J. 1663 (1989) (discussing the relationship between the role lawyers play in legitimating legal
institutions and the maintenance of professional authority); Simon, Ethical Discretionin Lawyering,
supra note 6 (proposing discretionary approach to reconciling client rights and the promotion of
justice). But see Cain, The General PracticeLawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical Conception,
7 INT'L J. Soc. L. 331 (1979) (challenging the sociological characterization of lawyers as agents of
social control).
8. In tracing the contours of lawyer rationality, I have relied on the archeological method of
Michel Foucault. Foucault employs the term archeology to designate a descriptive form of analysis
focusing on an archive. An archive is a set of discourses pronounced and transformed under specific historical circumstances.
To Foucault, the institutionalizations and transformations of discourse manifest practices obeying certain rules of formation and systems of functioning. By describing the consistent material
forms of these practices, he seeks to define the relations apparent on the surface of discourse. He
explains: "I attempt to make visible what is invisible only because it's too much on the surface of
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The rationality and discourse prevailing in the practice of poverty law constitute a system of power 9 and exclusion.10 I shall call that system ethical
lawyering. The system is marked by an internal tension between privileged
and subordinated structures of rationality and discourse. The poverty lawyer
privileges specific structures by elevating particular ways of thinking and
speaking about the client to the level of a dominant practice. This elevation
subordinates alternative ways of thinking and speaking.
The privileging of certain forms of rationality and discourse under ethical
lawyering is expressed in the ethic of suppression. The ethic rests on a vision
of the client as dependent and isolated. Guided by this ethic, the poverty
lawyer designs a plan of advocacy frequently devoid of meaningful client or
community participation. This lack of participation is attributable to the
lawyer's overlapping normative and empirical judgment of the client and juridical worlds. On empirical grounds, the lawyer may be convinced that client or community participation in advocacy is inefficient. On a normative
basis, he may believe that client participation is properly limited to narrow
spheres of decisionmaking. Accordingly, the lawyer may reason that the
suppression of the client or community participation is both prudent and
ethically imperative.
That logic is in tension with an alternative rationality and discourse of
ethical lawyer is manifested in the ethic of resistance. This ethic relies on a
countervailing vision of the client as autonomous and connected to a community. The concept of autonomy is a first principle of legal ethics."

The

things." M. FOUCAULT, The Archeology of Knowledge, in FOUCAULT LIVE (Interviews, 1966-84)
45, 45-46 (S.Lotringer ed. & J. Johnston trans. 1989).
Legal scholars have applied Foucault's methodology to study gender, sexuality, and doctrine.
See C. SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 4-25 (1989) (reformulating Foucault's concepts of truth, power, and knowledge to capture feminist reality); Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129, 1157-62 (1987)
(articulating the relationship of truth to power in studying gender); Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move From Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1736-38 (1989) (extending Foucault's analysis of discourse to doctrinal developments under Section 1983); Peritz, The "Rule of
Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraintof Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1989)
(redefining the framework of antitrust doctrinal history to reflect the tension between competition
and property logics); Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511
(1989) (studying the tension between the paradigms of competition policy and common-law property rights in vertical restraints doctrine); Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737
(1989) (dissecting the connection between sexuality and identity in apprehending personhood);
West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. L. F. 59 (cautioning against overbroad adoption of epistemology).
9. On the operation of power infecting legal discourse, see Ashe, supra note 8, at 1133, 1170. See
also P. GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs 186-87 (1987) (isolating the domains of local/historical power and the resistance engendered).
10. On forms of exclusion, see Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989) (revealing gendered
nature of legal language and reasoning).
11. Autonomy intimates an anti-utilitarian Kantian ethos. For an introduction to Kant's ethical
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counter-ethic of resistance enlarges the meaning of autonomy to include the
concept of connected community. Governed by this ethic, the poverty lawyer seeks to increase the scope of client and community participation in advocacy. For empirical support, he may speculate that such increased
participation will improve the outcome and efficiency of advocacy. For a
normative foundation, he may assert a revised concept of client autonomy
realized in connected community.
The contradictions generated by the tension between the ethics of suppres12
sion and resistance are often overlooked by accounts of lawyer advocacy,
premises, see I. KANT, GROUNDING THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 19-62 (J. Ellington trans.
1981); Grey, Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1987)
("Autonomy in Kant's sense is moral self-government, freedom from enslavement by inclination
and desire."); Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm Principle:A Reply to John Finnis,87 COLUM.
L. REV. 457, 461 (1987) ("The Kantian conception of autonomy is an original contribution to
moral and political philosophy in that it gives fundamental ethical weight to the moral powers of
persons to originate and raise normative claims of rationality and reasonableness.").
Monroe Freedman champions the rhetoric of client autonomy. See, e.g., Freedman, Personal
Responsibility in a ProfessionalSystem, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191, 204 (1978) ("[T]he attorney acts
both professionally and morally in assisting clients to maximize their autonomy, that is, by counselling clients candidly and fully regarding the clients' legal rights and moral responsibilities as the
lawyer perceives them .. ");Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U.L. REV.
331, 333 (1987) ("[T]he lawyer's principal function is to serve the client's autonomy-to allow the
client maximum freedom to exercise or to forgo rights to which the client is legally entitled."). See
also Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral EthicalRole: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 616-17 (arguing that increasing individual autonomy is morally good);
Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657, 663
("[A]utonomy is of singular significance in both personal and political terms.").
Thomas Shaffer, by contrast, spurns client autonomy as the highest good of professionalism.
Equating autonomy and abandonment, Shaffer argues that respect for client freedom artificially
limits community by returning the client to the world of strangers. Shafer, The Ethics of Dissent
and Friendshipin the American Professions,88 W. VA. L. REV. 623, 662 (1986). Compare D'Amato
& Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 761 (1983) (presenting a deontological
model of professional responsibility elevating moral obligation above client autonomy and social
need) and Luban, The LysistratianPrerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J.637, 639 (objecting to preferencing of individual autonomy over right or good conduct).
I will not here take up the question whether the enhancement of client autonomy improves the
character of the lawyer. For reflection on the preservation of the lawyer's moral character, see
Eshete, Does a Lawyer's CharacterMatter?, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS at 270 (D. Luban ed. 1983).
12. For divergent accounts of advocacy, see M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9-24 (contending zealous advocacy to be consonant with the safeguarding of the
public interest); Lohn & Ball, Legal Advocacy, Performance, and Affection, 16 GA. L. REV. 853,
856, 860 (1982) (advancing a theory of advocacy "understood as the performance of affection[ ]" in
an environment of cooperation and professional mutuality); Nelson, Moral Ethics, Adversary Justice, and Political Theory: Three Foundationsfor the Law of Professional Responsibility, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 911 (1989) (claiming a three-pronged approach to professional responsibility combining moral ethics, adversarial commitment, and pluralistic political values); Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C.L. REV. 519 (1979) (extolling lawyer
implementation of client rights and duties); Rhode, The Rhetoric of ProfessionalReform, 45 MD. L.
REV. 274 (1986); Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 11,
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competence, 13 discipline,' 4 and morality.' 5 The story of Josephine V. illusat 150 (asserting the moral accountability of the zealous lawyer); Shaffer, Advocacy as Moral Discourse, 57 N.C.L. REV. 647 (1979) (distinguishing adversary and moral discourse).
But see Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Otherwise, in THE GooD
LAWYER, supra note 11, at 214 (limiting the lawyer's duty of representation).
13. For overviews of lawyer competence, see Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession'sApproach
to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 639;
Rosenthal, Evaluating the Competence of Lawyers, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 257 (1976) (mapping a
research agenda for the formulation of standards to measure lawyer competence); Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism:A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission
on Professionalism, 18 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1149 (1987) (skeptical overview of reported decline in
professionalism); Trakman, Competence in Law: An Unending Search, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 401
(1982) (examining the meaning and parameters of professional competence in light of community
standards, societal expectations, and legal training); Weckstein, Maintainingthe Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1970) (applauding Code enforcement of professional competence and conduct).
14. On lawyer discipline and sanctions, see Gray & Harrison, Standardsfor Lawyer Discipline
and DisabilityProceedings and the Evaluation of Lawyer DisciplineSystems, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 529
(1982) (considering the structure, sanctions, and implementation of selected formal standards regulating lawyer discipline and disability proceedings); Hazard & Beard, A Lawyer's Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in ProfessionalDisciplinary Proceedings, 96 YALE L.J. 1060 (1987) (discussing
the evolution of lawyer disciplinary proceedings, particularly the availability of the privilege against
self-incrimination); Kelly, Lawyer Sanctions: Looking Through the Looking Glass, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 469 (1988) (reviewing empirical evidence of inconsistency in application of lawyer sanctions); Thode, Canons 6 and 7: The Lawyer-Client Relationship, 48 TEX. L. REV. 367 (1970) (quarreling with Code standards of competence and discipline).
15. On lawyer morality, see D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
Elkins, A Conversation Called Ethics, 10 LEGAL STUD. F. 265 (1986) (advocating the teaching of
professional responsibility as moral discourse); Gewirth, ProfessionalEthics: The Separatist Thesis,
96 ETHICS 282 (1986) (condemning the separatist thesis of specific professional-role morality as
mistaken insofar as it infringes on the equal rights of all persons required by a general principle of
morality); Held, The Division of Moral Labor and the Role of the Lawyer, Luban, The Adversary
System Excuse, Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics ofLaw,
and Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, all in THE GOOD LAWYER supra note 11

at 25, 38, 60, 83, 100-04, 259 (debating justifications for a separatist role-defined moral reasoning);
Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A PhilosophicalResearch Programfor Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L.
REv. 451 (1981) (investigating moral philosophy to clarify and resolve nettlesome issues in legal
ethics, particularly moral dilemmas spawned by conflicts between the ordinary morality and role
morality of lawyers); Pepper, supra note 11 (furnishing a moral justification for the lawyer's amoral
professional role); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63
(1980) (arguing that professional responsibility requires the experience and judgment of a moral
personality); Rhode, Ethical Perspectiveson Legal Practice,37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985) (advocating heightened lawyer sensitivity to moral consequences of conduct through ideological, structural,
and institutional reform of the profession); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 19 (1975) (considering the extent to which moral criticisms of the lawyer's
societal outlook and of the lawyer-client relationship derive from the fact that lawyers are professionals); Wasserstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1984) (celebrating the virtues of benevolence and compassion); Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed
Democracy (Book Review), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990) (reviewing D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988)) (exploring the moral role of lawyers who advocate for the
underrepresented); Gillers, Can A Good Lawyer Be A Bad Person? (Book Review), 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1011 (1986) (reviewing THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (D.
Luban ed. 1983) & S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE
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trates three such contradictions. The first stems from the denigration of Mrs.
V.'s assertions of autonomy, challenging the practices of a local welfare bureaucracy. The second emerges from the treatment of Mrs. V. in isolation
from the network of communities connected by class, gender, ethnicity, race,
and sexuality which suffer under common conditions of impoverishment.
The third arises out of advocacy practices which silence Mrs. V.'s telling of
her story of self-asserted autonomy and community aid. This is the contradiction visible in Mrs. V.'s moment of lawyer defiance, the moment of speaking out of turn.
The poverty lawyer experiences each of these contradictions when he espouses an ethic of rationality and discourse that restricts, rather than opens,
access to the world of the impoverished client. The story of Josephine V.
illustrates the consequences of this restriction. Access to the client world is
restricted in two ways. To begin, the poverty lawyer denies the client full
subjective status. This denial is effectuated by constituting the client as a
dependent object. 16 Situating the client as an object is not a tactic of advocacy to liberate her. If that instrumental purpose held sway, the client would
be otherwise recognized as a self-determining subject. Thus recognized, advocacy would seek to discover and promote expression of the multiple features of client autonomy and community.
Situated as a dependent object, the client is invisible. Deprived of the attributes of autonomy, she is consigned to the role of the "other without reciprocity." 17 Genuine reciprocity enables the client to participate18 in the
(1984)) (welcoming moral philosophers to the arena of legal ethics); Tomain, The Legal Heresiarchs: Luban's The Good Lawyer (Book Review), 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 693 (reviewing
THE GOOD LAWYER) (defining professional ethics and lawyering skills in terms of moral reasoning
and values).
16. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,supra

note 2 (describing the construction of client dependency as a form of interpretive violence).
17. GENDER AND READING: ESSAYS ON READERS, TEXTS, AND CONTEXTS xviii-xix (E. Flynn
& P. Schweickart eds. 1986) [hereinafter GENDER AND READING].

18. Here, I grant preference to the term "participation" over the more conventional term "decisionmaking." See Shaffer, The Ethics of Dissent and Friendshipin the American Professions, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 623, 663 (1986) ("The moral ideal in the professional relationship of lawyer and client
is the participatory ideal: The client is a partner and might become a friend."). Cf Wadlington,
Breaking the Silence of Doctorand Patient (Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 1640, 1642 (1984) (reviewing J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984)) (considering greater patient
participation in the medical decisionmaking process); Mariner, Informed Consent in the Post-Modern Era (Book Review), 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 385, 403 (1988) (reviewing R. FADEN & T.
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) & J. KATZ, THE SILENT

WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984)) (delineating the elements of autonomous decisionmaking). See also Meisel & Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent:A Review and
Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1983) (scrutinizing clinical studies and
components of informed consent).
Preference for this usage stems from the tendency in ethical lawyering to limit the opportunity for

and to distort the content of client decisionmaking. By partitioning the lawyer-client relation into
open and closed regions of decisionmaking, ethical rationality deprives the client of a meaningful
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public process of advocacy. Without such reciprocity, the client is a phantom invoked at different stages for reasons of instrumental legitimacy. 19
The poverty lawyer's denial of the client's public subjective status is sustained by the knowledge structures of class, 20 ethnicity, gender, 2 1 race, 22 and
sexuality. 2 3 These structures fit 24 lawyer-imposed configurations of client dependence and isolation. Privileged forms of rationality shield this demeaning
configuration, rendering alternative stories of client autonomy and commu25
nity unthinkable.
The forms of rationality are lawyer created. 26 They secure the imprimatur
access to participation in the lawyering process. On the process of lawyer decisionmaking, see
Nagel, Lawyer Decisionmaking and ThresholdAnalysis, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 615 (1982) (assigning
threshold values to components of lawyer decisionmaking in the absence of accurate cost-benefit
information).
19. On legitimation, see Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules, 59 TEX. L. REV.
639, 668 (1981).
Legitimation is the attempt by those engaged in some realm of social activity to offer a
normative justification for their actions. The attempt may be addressed to an external
audience, as in public relations, but it may also be a dialogue among the participants
themselves. Participants need not speak with a unified voice; segments can offer different,
even inconsistent accounts (in which case legitimation can also be a form of symbolic
politics, a competition for status through the declaration of moral superiority).
Id. (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., McCloud, Feminism's Idealist Error, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277
(1986) (examining class-differentiated impact of sexual equality jurisprudence upon women's formal
and substantive employment rights).
21. Christine Littleton notes the "identification of women with anything that is devalued, disaffirmed or disempowering." Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV.
1043, 1046 (1987) (footnote omitted). See also GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at xiii-xiv

(discerning false and repressive universals in the generalizations of theoretical constructs heedless of
the female perspective); Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 610 (1990) (enumerating categories of sexist speech).
22. See, e.g., Grider, Hair Salons and Racial Stereotypes.- The Impermissible Use of Racially
DiscriminatoryPricingSchemes, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1989) (classifying race as a social
construction); Omolade, Black Women, Black Men, and Tawana Brawley-The Shared Condition,
12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 11, 16 (1989) (documenting the historical muting of Black women's voices
and experiences); Piatt, Attorney as Interpreter:A Return to Babble, 20 N.M.L. REV. 1 (1990) (criticizing the treatment of the language rights of non-English-speaking people of color).
23. See, e.g., R. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 23-45 (1988)

(elucidating the perception and status of gay men); Gomez, Repeat After Me: WeAre Different. We
Are the Same, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 935 (1986) (illuminating the multiple perspectives of Black/gay people); Kennard, Ourself Behind Ourself."A Theory for Lesbian Readers, in
GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at 63, 65 (cautioning against subsuming lesbian difference
under the rubric of a universal female concept of identity); Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles,Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 907 (1986) (considering
the repression of lesbian norms in custody disputes).
24. See Finley, supra note 10, at 904-05 (showing how legal language and reasoning fit women's
experiences into male categories of thought).
25. On the unthinkable quality of women's experience, see C. HEILBRUN, WRITING A WOMAN'S

LIFE 44 (1988)("[M]ale power has made certain stories unthinkable.").
26. Compare M. FOUCAULT, How Much Does It Cost For Reason To Tell the Truth, in Fou-
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of ethics by limiting the advocacy process to a bounded set of discursive
practices. Delimited in advance, those practices omit reference to vital experiences of autonomy and community which compose the client's world.
The omission of these animating experiences is linked to the instrumentalist
logic of poverty law advocacy.
That logic conflates reason and necessity: What once appeared instrumentally necessary to prevail in advocacy is transformed into a transcendent
principle of rationality. 27 In this fusion, reason loses its contextual footing. 28
Client dependence and isolation are consequently entrenched and viewed as
elements of a benign natural state. Extrapolating from this essentialist premise, the poverty lawyer deems client dependence and isolation to be necessary
conditions of lawyering. These spurious universal traits conceal the suppressive power of ethical lawyering, and the client's struggle to resist pernicious
lawyer identity-making practices. The poverty lawyer's blithe acceptance of
subordinated 29 client identity distorts the lawyer-client relation by assuming
30
the rationality of lawyer dominance.
The distortion is tolerated, and indeed encouraged, by conventional ethical
systems. 31 Under these systems, client dependence and isolation are conCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 243-44 (describing the self-creation of reason). Analyzing developments in the forms of rationality, Foucault seeks to isolate "various proofs, various formulations,
various modifications by which rationalities educe each other, contradict one another, [and] chase
each other away[.]" Id at 244.
27. On the distinction between ideology and necessity in the historical subjection of women, see
Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,56 IND. L.J. 375, 424-26 (1981).
28. Compare Goldfarb, The Theory-PracticeSpiral. Insightsfrom Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming) and Yngvesson, Disputing Alternatives: Settlements as Science and as Politics (Book Review), 13 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 113, 130-31 (1988) (reviewing S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)) (pointing to the requisite use
of contextual knowledge in skilled mediation).
29. On the overt and covert rhetoric of subordination, see Shevelow, Fathers and Daughters"
Women as Readers of the Tatler, in GENDER AND READING, supra note 20, at 107, 108-09, 121.
The rhetoric of subordination implies client incapacity to comprehend and reason. Cf
Wadlington, supra note 18, at 1651 (assailing doctors' failure to recognize patients' individual capabilities to comprehend and reason).
30. See West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation:Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 237 (1987) ("When we accept a state of the world that derives
from an act of power as a part of the natural world, we lose sense of how to evaluate that state of the
world[.]") (emphasis in original).
31. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE];
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908) [hereinafter CANONS].
For an historical overview, see Abel, supra note 19; Frankel, Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874
(1976) (reviewing the Model Code and comparing standards of conduct commanded by the Canons
and the Model Code); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 702 (1977) (criticism of Model Code represents pressure to reform the requirements of professional responsibility); Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 TEX, L. REV. 689 (1981); Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 939 (comparing interpretive and enforcement
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strued simply as descriptive statements of a material reality. 32 That approved
construction sanctions hierarchical practices of discourse,33 presenting a coherence and uniformity of client identity contradicted by the discontinuities
of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexuality. Generated by alternative
structures of rationality, those discontinuities exemplify autonomous con34
structions of identity in connected communities.
weaknesses of the Model Code and Model Rules); Sutton, How Vulnerable Is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C.L. REV. 497 (1979) (urging revision of Model Code standards); Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. An Introduction, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 255 (1970) (enumerating deficiencies of the Canons and remedial measures of the Model

Code).
For a defense of the Model Rules, see Frankel, Why Does ProfessorAbel Work at a Useless Task?,
59 TEX. L. REV. 723 (1981) (offering modest support for the Model Rules); Hodes, The Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility, the Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas
in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739 (1981) (praising increased candor brought to client-public
understanding of law and lawyering); Kutak, Evaluating the ProposedModel Rules of Professional
Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1016 (justifying intermediate level of generality of Model
Rules); Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some ObservationsAbout the ProposedModel Rules of
Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1980) (applauding the Model Rules and noting controversial areas); Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision
Making and the Role ofRules in Structuringthe Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 1003 (advocating reallocation of lawyer-client decisionmaking authority favored by the Model
Rules); Stark, Review Essay, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 12 CONN. L. REV. 948
(1980) (discussing principal differences between the Model Code and the Model Rules).
Scholars have assailed the Model Rules on an assortment of grounds. Stephen Gillers denounces
the Model Rules as "an astonishingly parochial, self-aggrandizing document" acclaiming and protecting lawyer-centered prerogatives over competing client, third-party interests, and juridical interests. Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics:"A Critical View of the Model
Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 245 (1985) (analyzing the interests of lawyers, clients, third party
others, and the profession in dyad relations). Gillers also derides the Model Rules for internal
inconsistency and for masking inflationary controls on the availability of legal services. Id.
In contrast, Monroe Freedman views the Model Rules as an assault on confidentiality and an
attack on the adversary system, thus imperiling the Constitution. Freedman, Are the Model Rules
Unconstitutional?,35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685, 690 (1981). Cf Patterson, The Function of a Code of
Legal Ethics, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 695 (1981) (reproaching the Model Rules for failing to integrate
derivative lawyer rights and duties with client positive law rights and duties in measuring the allocation of lawyer discretionary decisionmaking authority).
Other scholars have upended the Model Rules by distinguishing between code and character.
Thomas Shaffer advances two propositions in this regard. First, he contends that "[s]ound ethical
codes in the professions are those which depend on character[.]" Shaffer, The Professionas a Moral
Teacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 195, 249 (1986). Second, he claims that "[e]thical codes in which that
dependence is not understood are corrupt and corrupting." Using stories for illustration, Shaffer
argues that "character helps us survive the corruption of our codes." Id. at 249.
32. Cf. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics? (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1310 (1989) (reviewing
M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1988)) (attacking the belief in the necessary congruence between legal statements and fact).
33. On legal and political discourses of power and the reproduction of social hierarchy, see Rosenberg, Another History of Free Speech: The 1920s and the 1940s, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 333
(1989).
34. Discontinuities are manifested in alternative storytellings of social life. See Minda, Phenomenology, Tina Turner and the Law, 16 N.M.L. REV. 479, 487 (1986) (advancing a consciousness-
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II.

SUBORDINATED STORIES

The construction of client identity embodied in the ethics of suppression
and resistance are communicated in story form. Both the rationality and
discourse of these competing ethics is displayed in stock stories. 35 Thomas
Shaffer argues that the study of legal ethics is illuminated by the reading of
stories. Shaffer contends that the truth of individual, family, and community
morality is "more a matter of character, of life as we live it, of story, than it is
of principles." 36 To Shaffer, stories elucidate moral principles.
Listening to and giving voice to client stories provides a contextual method
of exploring and recasting the ethics of advocacy. Without recasting, the
ethic of suppression privileges the voice and story of the lawyer, and subordinates the competing voice and story of the client. 37 Read together, lawyerchronicled stories are strikingly similar in their characterization of the client.
Whether the narrative portrays the client as impoverished, female, or of
color, the description invariably constructs an image of the client as dependent and isolated. This image is conveyed in mundane lawyer acts, and circulated in routine lawyer pronouncements. Through these acts and
pronouncements, the lawyer becomes inured to the role and expectation of
38
client silence.
The ethic of suppression disguises the poverty lawyer's normative assessment of the client's world. Belittling normative evaluation in the guise of
factual description erodes the client's public autonomy. 39 This erosion reinforces the lawyer's public narrative of suppression.
Because the ethical poverty lawyer judges the predominance of his own
based critique of legal analysis employed "to reveal the artificial and contingent nature of legal
interpretations of reality.") (footnote omitted).
35. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1, 3 (1984). See also C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 54 (1987) ("Social situation is expressed through
the concepts people construct to make sense of their situation."); Cunningham, A New Way of
PracticingLaw: The Lawyer as Translator(1990) (unpublished manuscript); Cunningham, A Tale
of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989) (lawyering as a
form of translation); Dahl, Taking Women as a Starting Point: Building Women's Law, 14 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 239, 240-41 (1986) (noting that stock stories of women's dependence may infect private and
public spheres of experience).
36. See Shaffer, Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33 MERCER L. REV. 877,
882, 884-88 (1982) (viewing legal ethics as an ethical subject rather than a legal one).
37. For a discussion of client subordination, see Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative,supra note 2; White, Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., supra note 2.
38. For a discussion of roles and expectations, see Hazard, Communitarian Ethics and Legal
Justification, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 721, 735 (1988) ("IT]he question remains as to which role, and
which set of corresponding expectations, ought to determine the question of what is right to do.").
39. Normative evaluation may attach privileged meaning to class, gender, and race. See, e.g., C.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 35, at 54 ("[T]heories constructed by those with
the social experience of men, most particularly by those who are not conscious that gender is a
specific social circumstance, will be, at the least, open to being male theories.").
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narrative as legitimate, he expects the client to adhere without resistance.
This misunderstanding of social life is explained by the illusory logic of
subordination.
Like other forms of rationality, subordination is a stock story. The mean40
ing of the story is found in a condoned hierarchical social arrangement.
The poverty lawyer perceives this arrangement as the natural and necessary
order of the lawyer-client relation.
The positing of hierarchy as an inherent property of poverty law practice is
a product of lawyer self-reference. 4 1 In the self-referencing system of suppression, the observed world of the client is mediated and thereby distorted
by the expectation of dependence and isolation. The end result is a world
contrived by the lawyer's imagination. The crux of ethical lawyering ex42
pressed in storytelling lies in this distortion.
Notwithstanding his distorting ethic, the poverty lawyer adopts the posture of a neutral technician, of a craftsman at work. 4 3 Denouncing this
stance of objective neutrality, Catharine MacKinnon contends that "[i]t is
40. On Cartesian dualism and the permanent a prioristructures of meaning in the social world,

see R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 107-14, 138, 159
(1976). For a helpful intioduction to Cartesian rhetoric, see T. CARR, DESCARTES AND THE RE(1990).
Deceived by his own structure of dualistic thinking, the lawyer mistakes his narrative for neutral,
objective description. See Minda, supra note 34, at 482 (attributing the dualistic perception of social
life to the structure of legal consciousness).
Bernstein maintains that "what we judge to be an adequate interpretationof social action is itself
dependent on our understandingof the causal determinants of social action." R. BERNSTEIN, supra,
at 167 (emphasis in original).
41. Bernstein comments: "Individuals in their social and political lives are self interpreting beings. The ways in which they interpret their own actions and those of others are not externally
related to, but constitutive of, those actions." R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 156.
42. See D. COOLE, WOMEN IN POLITICAL THEORY: FROM ANCIENT MISOGYNY TO CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM 268 (1988) (disclosing the structuralist and post-structuralist feminist insight
that "it is the male who constructs a mirror of himself which he mistakes for knowledge"); Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1280-81 (1987) (describing the
process of representing the male experience as truth); Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New
Voices in the Legal ProfessionMaking New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 43 ("[W]hat
we know has largely been imposed on us as 'truth' by a particular class of truth creators and
interpreters.").
43. See, e.g., Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of Implicationsand
Possibilities,54 TENN. L. REV. 345, 388 (1987) (promoting an aesthetic approach to law dedicated
to craft, craftsmanship, and professional technique).
Compare J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW
(1985) (defending account of the law as a rhetorical and literary activity) and CH. PERELMAN & L.
OLBRECHTSTYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (J. Wilkenson & P.
Weaver trans. 1969) (laying the groundwork for the study of discursive techniques of argumentation) with B. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 161 (1988) (challenging White's
appreciation of advocacy and truth) and R. BARTHES, WRITING DEGREE ZERO 62-73 (1953) (tracing the "bourgeois heritage" of style as craftsmanship).
SILIENCE OF RHETORIC: VARIETIES OF CARTESIAN RHETORICAL THEORY
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only a subject who gets to take the objective standpoint."" The stance of the
poverty lawyer is the feigned objectivity of the male subject. By exerting
power, he gains "social access to being that self which takes the stance that is
points out, "that objective perallowed to be objective[.]"' 4 5 As MacKinnon
46
male."
socially
is
subject,
a
is
son who
Christine Littleton conceives of the male power to define and construct
reality as the power to speak the world. She argues that male power-phallocentrism-"defines the boundaries of acceptable discourse-not only of
what can be heard and responded to, but also to some extent of what can be
47

thought."

A.

SUPPRESSION

To the extent that ethical lawyering is formulated by stories of dependence
and isolation, client autonomy and community connection are suppressed.
Suppression is embedded in the poverty lawyer's basic narratives, stifling discourse capable of reconstituting the lawyer-client relation. 48 Absent reconstitution, client autonomy is circumscribed by lawyer tolerance.
The boundaries of poverty lawyer tolerance coincide with the limits of suppressive rationality and discourse. These limits preclude the lawyer from imagining the client as a self-determining subject. When ways of speaking
prohibit the client from enjoying the status of an independent creator of
meaning in the public world, the client's public capacity to act autonomously
49

isweakened.

The ethic of suppression 50 is deceiving because it simultaneously excludes
44. C. MACKINNON, supra note 35, at 55. The male subject interprets the world from a masculine perspective. From this point of view, the experience of dominance is central. See id. ("A subject is a self. An object is other to that self... it is men socially who are subjects, women socially
who are other, objects."). See also D. COOLE,supra note 42, at 267 (describing theorizing "as a
form of domination, whereby the theorist conceptually appropriates the objects of knowledge at the
same time imposing his own laws upon them"); Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, in NEW
FRENCH FEMINISMS 99 (E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1980) (remarking that "female sexuality
has always been theorized within masculine parameters.").
45. C. MACKINNON, supra note 35, at 55.
46. Id.
47. Littleton, supra note 42, at 1318 (footnote omitted). See also H-G. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS 179 (1985) (on the non-linguistic understanding circumscribing the space
within which speaking-with-each-other and listening-to-each-other take place).
48. Compare M. FOUCAULT, Sexual Choice, Sexual Act, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at
211-31 (pursuing a similar analysis of sexuality); M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITYVOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (R. Hurley trans. 1978).
49. C. MACKINNON, supra note 35, at 49. MacKinnon's implicit sense of autonomy evokes
Lawrence Haworth's notion of procedural independence. See Haworth, Autonomy and Utility, 95
ETHICS 5, 8-9 (1984) (characterizing autonomy in part as procedural independence realized in the
individual's relationship with others).
50. For an explication of Foucault's theory of societal repression-suppression systems, see M.
FOUCAULT,

Rituals of Exclusion, in

FOUCAULT LIVE,

supra note 8, at 63, 65.
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and absorbs the client in the advocacy process. In this beguiling ritual, the
client obtains aid, but surrenders her voice and story. Legal assistance is
conditional on the waiver of autonomous participation.
Public acts of suppression pervade the lawyer-client relation, inhibiting client resistance, and rationalizing dependence. The rationalization of dependence hinges on the pretense of client silence. That pretence is overthrown
when client speech is understood to consist of "intensities, rumblings, muffled things, thicknesses, repetitions, things hardly spoken .... ,,5i
Even when the pretense of silence is overcome, the muffled voice of the
client is often not fully heard. Suppression blocks the translation of things
hardly spoken into autonomous speech. Despite this impediment, speech can
emerge revealing the voices and stories of the autonomous client. The poverty lawyer's retelling of suppressed stories supplies the opening for client
resistance. 52
B.

RESISTANCE

Obtaining space sufficient to overturn lawyer narrative and install a selfproclaimed client narrative rests on opposing strategies of rationality and discourse. These strategies affirm a client world infused with the values of autonomy, community, and participation. Such values are always immanent.
Removing the constraints suppressing their declaration requires finding and
inciting the elementary power of resistance.5 3 The power of resistance is not
anterior to the power of suppression. The two powers are in fact
54
coextensive.
Indeed, client resistance is a concurrent form of social power. Inventive
and mobile, it works "to organize, coagulate, and solidify itself."155 Withheld
underneath false layers of imposed identity, it distributes itself strategically
51. M. FOUCAULT, I, Pierre Riviere, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 131, 136 (describing
nineteenth and twentieth century peasant culture).
52. For Foucault, the task is to formulate description "in a kind of virtual break, which opens
room, understood as a room of concrete freedom, that is possible transformation." M. FOUCAULT,
Reason to Tell the Truth, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 252.
53. Foucault stresses the importance of studying "the manner in which power gives itself over to
representation." M. FOUCAULT, Monarchy of Sex, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 148. Relocating power from the narrow purview of political life, he comments that "[t]he relations of power
are perhaps the most hidden things in the social body." Id. By unlocking power from forms appended to the state apparatus, economic relations, and individual interiorization, Foucault proposes
to "investigate what might be most hidden in power relations; anchor them in their economic infrastructures; trace them not only in their governmental forms but also in their infra-governmental or
para-governmental ones; and recuperate them in their material play." Id.
54. Foucault argues that resistance "is not anterior to the power which it opposes. It is coextensive with it and absolutely its contemporary." Id. at 153.
55. Foucault maintains: "As soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance. We are never trapped by power; we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and
according to a precise strategy." Id.
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against suppression. Viewed as a strategy of opposition, client resistance is
always materializing, propelled by the discontinuities of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexuality. 56 Hence, the lawyer-client relation is always
strained, pulled in the opposite directions of suppression and resistance.
The pulling of ethical lawyering against itself ceaselessly transforms the
lawyer-client relation. The relation shifts even when rationality and discourse make claims of constancy. Depending on the degree of dissonance
space available for autonomy and
between suppression and resistance, the
7
expand.
or
community may contract
The enlargement and contraction may not be immediately obvious in discourse. At points, the lawyer-client relation may accommodate a mixed discourse, entangling strands of suppression and resistance. Martha Minow's
investigation of social roles exposes life patterns containing this mixed discourse. These patterns interweave strands of autonomy and dependence,
self-reliance and helplessness. The complexity of these patterns reveal the
vigor of narrative contests over the meaning of the client's world, and reaffirms the importance of resistance expressed in the telling of personal
stories.58

III.

THE STORY OF JOSEPHINE V.

The story of Josephine V. highlights the tension between the ethics of sup56. In this way, client resistance does not operate merely as a negation based on opposition, but
as an affirmative strategy of survival. See GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at xxx.
57. Both Lucie White and Foucault esteem drama as a forum for open discourse. White contends such discourse "enable[s] speakers to fashion new forms of collective speech, new patterns of
culture from their diverse, fragmented histories." White, Making Space for Clients to Speak, supra
note 2, at 557. Citing the "Los Angeles Poverty Department,' an improvisational revolutionary
theater group composed of a loose confederation of the sometimes-homeless, she argues that theater
induces changes in the self-understanding of the participants and in the other-understanding of the

audience by suspending and restructuring social patterns of the everyday world.
Like Foucault, White admires drama as a space in which subordinated people "assume the power
to define social reality" in accordance with their own self-proclaimed narrative. Id. at 562. The
terms of this narrative invert discursive practices and social relations of dependency prevalent in
daily life. This inversion acquires political significance when the practices and relation of dominance are permanently toppled.
Foucault attaches political importance to creating the possibilities for peasants to "play themselves, with their own means, in a drama which is of their generation[.]" For Foucault, the acting
out of such human texts creates a space where the poor can meet and talk about the common
themes of their daily lives. M. FOUCAULT, I, PierreRiviere, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at
134-35.
58. See Minow, "Forming UnderneathEverything that Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 882, 824-39 (noting the often obscured abilities of individuals to combine
dependency and independence in defining their social roles); Paul, Private/Property:A Discourse on
Gender Inequality in American Law, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 399, 433 (1989) (disclosing the shuttered reality of women's bifurcated legal existence in a male world of discursive domination).
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pression and resistance operating in daily poverty law practice.59 In retelling
the events of Mrs. V.'s story, I have concentrated on the contextual exposition 6° of suppression and resistance in the public sphere of an administrative
hearing. 61 The study of resistance in this forum demonstrates how the voice
62
and story of an impoverished Hispanic woman may construct a reality
where daily acts of autonomy and community are honored rather than covertly or overtly suppressed. 63 Mrs. V.'s struggle to resist lawyer suppressive
discourse is indicative of the struggle internal to ethical lawyering. 64
Her act of speaking out reveals the upheaval produced by the ethic of
resistance. In this upheaval, traditional lawyer and client roles are displaced
59. The story flows unsolicited. For a searching analysis of solicitation in a broader context, see
Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 325 (1986) (inferring that solicitation serves interests
undervalued by ethical canons). Cf Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed Code ofProfessional Standards, 57 N.C.L. REV. 559 (1979) (inspecting the economics of solicitation in the
purchase and delivery of legal services).
60. Contextual ethical critique focuses on the lawyer-client situation. Geoffrey Hazard points
out that "[e]thical deliberation and ethical conduct are unintelligible if considered only in terms of
rules or principles or precepts, apart from situation." Hazard, Book Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 393, 397 (1988) (reviewing T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987)).
61. For an empirical evaluation and survey of informal adjudication procedures applied by federal and state administrative agencies, see Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures,43
CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976). See also Norton, Public Assistance, Post-New Deal Bureaucracy, and the
Law: Learningfrom Negative Models, 92 YALE L.J. 1287 (1983) (encouraging decentralized administrative reform).
62. On the centrality of discourse, see P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Transformative Legal
Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1145 (1988) (asserting that "individual reality is socially
constructed in and through dialogue with others."); Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self-A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 248 (1988)
(reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (discussing experiential discourse in
feminist methodology)).
On the denigration of everyday existence in the construction of social problems, see Edelman,
The Constructionof Social Problemsas Buttresses ofInequalities,42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 7, 28 (1987).
63. On the covert refusal to allow women to speak, see Suleiman, Malraux's Women: A Re-vision
in GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at 124, 130.
64. A second locus of study is the dual advocacy strategy evinced in Mrs. V.'s case. The strategy
combined the tactics of lawyer and group lay advocacy. Because lay advocacy was abandoned at an
incipient stage in favor of lawyer intervention, it is impossible to fairly compare the utility of the
two tactics in this instance. Cf. Greenebaum, Law Firms and Clients as Groups: Loyalty, Rationality, and Representation, 13 J. LEGAL PROF. 205 (1988) (evaluating role behavior and group dynamirs in the process of representation).
The difficulty in securing an accurate comparison of advocacy tactics presents a propitious opportunity to critique ethical lawyering from the stance of discursive practice rather than solely in terms
of material outcome. From this vantage point, the telling of client story is probed as a discrete but
intricately linked component of material outcome.
By establishing an alternative bench mark to gauge the aftermath of ethical lawyering, I do not
suppose any superiority of method. The advantage of a discursive measurement is the wider range
of understanding garnered. For this reason, I do not recommend the analytic severing of discourse
and outcome. I merely endorse exploiting the instant ambiguity of advocacy strategy to make headway in obtaining a fuller appreciation of the detrimental effects of dominant discursive practices.
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by new formations free of preordained notions of ethical rationality and discourse. Role modification unfetters the limits of poverty law practice creating an opportunity for the client to assert autonomous identity-to speak out
of turn.

65

Client resistance is fostered by putting forth an alternative system of rationality and discourse rooted in an autonomous vision of client identity and
rights.66 Even when rights are defined formalistically, as in Mrs. V.'s case,
their embrace may enable the client to assert her own narrative, to tell her
individual story in her own voice.
The key to rights discourse is struggle. Rights are signs of individual and
collective struggle. They demand the consummation of the promise held out
by the dominant normative order. In a rudimentary sense, rights are alarms
of protest transcending the divisions of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and
sexuality.67
Rights are not an ethereal stratum of discourse separated from the base
line of social relations. Nor are they lockstep mechanisms obeying the precise design of dominant juridical structures. 68 Instead, rights are thick, supple implements of political struggle. 69 Like political struggle itself, the
65. Foucault traces a similar movement in philosophy where "one detaches oneself from what
are the received truths and seeks other rules of the game." M. FOUCAULT, The Masked Philosopher, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 193, 200-01. He opines: "From philosophy comes the

displacement and transformation of the limits of thought, the modification of received values and all
the work done to think otherwise, to do something else, to become other than what one is." Id. at
201.
66. The proliferation of resistance as an alternative meaning may well constitute an inherent
aspect of interpretive divergence in all communities. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 33-40 (1983) (comparing Garrisonian and radical models of antislavery constitutionalism). That larger inquiry, however, is beyond the scope of this limited project. In this instance, I
commit to a more modest undertaking. Drawing upon a single client history for illumination, I
venture to discover the meaning of voice and story overlooked in the dominant narrative of ethical
lawyering.
67. Debate over rights discourse continues to embroil the theoretical movements within the legal
academy. See, e.g., Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment.- Transformationand Legitimation
in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (Critical Race Theory); Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Questfor Equality of Opportunity: A CriticalLegal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 295, 385 (1988) (Critical Legal Studies); Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (feminist theory).
But cf Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?, 94 ETHIcS 441 (1984) (arguing that
rights categories are inappropriate in the context of close personal relationships characterized by
intimacy, genuine care, love, and emotional involvement); C. SMART, supra note 7, at 138-59 (exploring the detrimental rhetoric and strategies of women's rights).
68. See Smart, Feminism and Law: Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy, 14 INT'L J. Soc. L.
109, 111 (1986) ("[L]aw itself is not a unified entity, indivisible in terms of structure and effects.").
69. On the interconnection of legal rights and political struggle, see Law, Equality: The Power
and Limits of the Law (Book Review), 95 YALE L.J. 1769, 1783 (1986) (reviewing Z. EISENSTEIN,
FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY (1984)) (asserting that rights "acquire concrete meaning only

as people act collectively to claim them.") (footnote omitted).
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meaning of even well-settled rights is always open to the interpretive future. 70
In the public process of representing Mrs. V., rights were exhibited in discourse, in rights talk. Although the talk-my lawyer talk-was primarily
one-sided and unilateral, it did not prevent Mrs. V. drawing on her experiences as an impoverished Hispanic woman and mother living in a community actively engaged in practices of self-help and mutual aid.
The inclusion of these experiences in ethical lawyering runs counter to the
rationality and discourse of suppression. Such rationality yields only partial
knowledge, informed and disseminated by self-referential lawyer narrative. 7 1
Omitted from this narrative are the competing voices and stories of client
70. Serving as the backdrop of legal disputes, rights create opportunities for resistance in the
minds of the disputants. See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 631-33 15 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 631, (1980-81). The transformative process of creating opportunities for resistance in the form of rights talk spans the
interrelated stages of naming (perceiving injury), blaming (fixing responsibility), and claiming (seeking redress). This process is reactive undergoing definition and redefinition in response to the alterations of discourse. Id. at 636-45. See also Breger, Pursuing Justice: Pitfalls and Prospects, 34
STAN. L. REV. 685, 692 (1982) (reviewing M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980)) ("Legal needs
depend in part on client perception, in part on attorney manipulation, and in part on cultural conceptions of legality.").
Compare Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1647, 1666 (1989) (citing AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (G.
Teubner ed. 1988) (describing the creation of an autopoietic system through a "network of operations constituting further legal statements") and Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 727, 736 (1989) (contending that autopoietic
systems "recursively produce their own elements from the network of their elements").
For expansion of Luhmann's sociological theory of law, see Rottleuthner, A Purified Sociology of
Law: Niklas Luhmann on the Autonomy of the Legal System, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 779, 779
(1989) (defining autopoiesis as the "internal operations of self-production").
71. Stanley Fish's theory of contextual interpretation explicates the power of lawyer narrative.
See Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationin Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551,
563-64 (1982) [hereinafter Working on the Chain Gang]. Probing the interior of professional narrative, Fish discerns implicit meanings preselected by education and training. These meanings become available to the lawyer through the adoption of "the norms, standards, criteria of evidence,
purposes, and goals of a shared enterprise[.]" Because dominant narrative is engraved by privileged
meanings, lawyers are unable to confront client narrative untainted by their own interested perceptions. Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1339 (1984) (emphasis in original). Cf Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (claiming interpretive narrative constrained by disciplining rules and authoritative standards of community); Brest, Interpretationand
Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982) (questioning composition and normative insulation of the
dominant interpretive community).
In this sense, prevailing lawyer narrative acts as an interpretive constraint to gaining access to the
client world. Like interpreters, lawyers "are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible
and not possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, what will and will not be heard
as evidence, in a given enterprise[.]" Operating within these constraints, lawyers "see and bring
others to see" the contorted shape of the client world. Fish, Working on the Chain Gang, supra, at
562.
Patrocinio Schweickart notes that Fish's ruling interpretive communities are androcentric in their
choice of strategies and modes of thought. Schweickart, Reading Ourselves Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading, in GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at 31, 50.
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resistance traced to class, gender, and race. This omission accounts for the
silence of the subordinated client. Properly understood, silence is an emblem
72
of exclusion.
The story of Josephine V. shows that the poverty lawyer's ethic of suppression may be challenged by the client's ethic of resistance. As the story demonstrates, the public encounter and tension between suppression and
resistance may occur suddenly, albeit briefly. When the rationality of resistance joins with the discourse of rights, the client may find the interval of
space to muster the strength to speak out of turn.
A.

JOSEPHINE V.

Josephine V. was twenty-seven years old, impoverished, 7 3 and living in the
South Bronx, when I interviewed her in the neighborhood legal aid office.
During the first week of June, 1986, in her seventh month of pregnancy, Mrs.
V. visited the local Income Maintenance (IM) Center 74 to apply for public
75
Income Maintenance workers 76
assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid.
provided her with an application, and scheduled an interview to be held the
77
following week.
72. On the roots and experience of women's silence, see M. BELENKY, B. CLINCHY, N. GOLDBERGER, & J. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND
MIND 17-34, 146-48 (1986); Finley, supra note 10.
Additional explanation of exclusion-associated silence may be found in muted group theory. This
theory postulates women as a group muted by the dominant-male--idiom, especially in the realm

of formal, public discourse. See

GENDER AND READING,

supra note 17, at xvi.

73. The terms "impoverished" and "impoverishment" (of women) are employed throughout the
text to ensure a more accurate account of women's experience under conditions of poverty. These
terms replace the well-accepted but misleading concept of the "feminization of poverty." See Littleton, supra note 21, at 1043. See also T. BARRETT-LENNARD, THE POSITION IN LAW OF WOMEN
21-24 (1983) (reviewing women's rights and duties under English Poor Laws); A. DAVIS, WOMEN,
CULTURE, & POLITICS 23-33 (1989) (remarking on the obscurantist impact of the concept of the
"feminization of poverty" in cloaking economic setbacks of the Black community).
74. An Income Maintenance Center (IMC) is the modern equivalent of the public welfare bureaus of the New Deal era. In general, an IMC serves the entitlement needs of a specific geographic
area. For an analysis of the formalized and bureaucratized administration of public benefits, see
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
75. For recent studies of public welfare programs, see Handler, The Transformation of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 457 (1987-88); Quadagno, Race, Class and Gender in the US. Welfare State:
Nixon's Failed Family Assistance Plan, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 11 (1990); Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
Compare Maranville, Welfare and Federalism,36 Loy. L. REV. 1 (1990) (summarizing historical
and philosophical foundations of the AFDC program) with Barry, The Welfare State versus the
Relief of Poverty, 100 ETHICS 503 (1990) (contemplating alternate philosophical justifications for
income maintenance programs).
76. Unlike social workers, Income Maintenance workers (IM workers) are exclusively public
entitlement eligibility specialists. For an historical comparison of the two roles, see Simon, The
Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985).
77. Hearing Record at 6, 17-18 [Hereinafter Record].
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On June 17, 1986, Mrs. V. returned to the Center for an eligibility interview. At the interview, the IM worker informed her that an appropriate
public benefits case would be opened and instructed her to submit a letter
showing proof of pregnancy. A document supplied by the worker advised
her "when to go back and bring in the proof,"' 78 setting a deadline of June 26,
1986.

79

Hurrying to furnish proof before the June 26th deadline, Mrs. V. traveled
to the hospital to procure a doctor's letter confirming her pregnancy. Once
she obtained the needed letter, she called the Center and requested permission to submit proof of pregnancy. When the IM worker granted permission,
80
she delivered the letter to the Center.
At the Center Mrs. V. asked the IM worker: "When would they be able to
put the baby on the budget[?]" 8' The worker responded that the child would
be added to the budget immediately, without a birth certificate, provided
Mrs. V. presented a hospital letter verifying the birth of the child. Complaining that her public assistance grant was insufficient to pay the rent in the
interim, Mrs. V. was advised to borrow to meet the July rent. Fearing evic2
tion, she borrowed $63.68 from a friend.
On August 7, 1986, Mrs. V. returned to the Center for a recertification
interview. After notifying the IM worker of her arrival, she began to experience labor pain. Hearing of the onset of labor, the worker's supervisor excused her from attending the recertification interview. Mrs. V. quickly
departed the Center and entered the hospital where she remained until her
83
pain subsided.
On August 12, 1986, Mrs. V. gave birth to a daughter. Upon her discharge from the hospital on August 18, 1986, Mrs. V. called the IM worker
to announce the birth of the child and to apprise her of the contents of a
hospital letter verifying the date of the birth. The worker replied that the
Center did not accept that type of letter. Mrs. V. countered that a prior
worker had assured her that submission of the letter "would put the baby on
the budget."'8 4 Confessing regret, the worker insisted that Mrs. V. must wait
until the receipt of the birth certificate. 5
Inthe first week of September, 1986, Mrs. V. called the IM worker asking
"again" about her daughter, emphasizing that she had no clothing, Pampers
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id. 19, 21.
Mrs. V. described her experience as "false labor." Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 6, 21, 23.
Id. at 23, 26-27.
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or milk.8 6 The worker answered that the Center "couldn't do anything for
[her]."18 7 When pressed, the worker disclosed that because Mrs. V. "didn['t]

have the Birth Certificate," the Center had "no kind of proof."' 88 Consequently, she argued, Mrs. V. had to wait.8 9
During the second or third week of September, 1986, Mrs. V. called the
IM worker to mention that she had received the birth certificate at home and
"wanted to take it in, let them apply the baby to the budget." 90 The worker
directed her to the fifth floor receptionist area window. Accordingly, Mrs. V.
returned to the Center and "went to the window to leave the Birth Certificate
[.],,91 But, the IM workers rebuked her, claiming "they couldn't accept it,

'cause [she] didn't have the [hospital] clinic card for the baby." ' 9 2 Instead,
93
they admonished her to call her worker.
On October 10, 1986, Mrs. V. revisited the Center receptionist area to
deliver a copy of her daughter's clinic card and birth certificate. IM workers
instructed her to call the assigned worker to report conveyance of the documents. Refusing, she opted to journey upstairs to the sixth floor "face-toface" 94 area in an effort to communicate with the worker directly. Locating
the worker, Mrs. V. introduced herself and "let her know" that the child's
birth certificate and clinic card were downstairs. 9 5 She also inquired: "When
'96
would the baby be added[?]"

On or about October 27, 1986, Mrs. V. received a letter from the IM
worker commanding her attendance at the Center on October 31, 1986. The
letter explained attendance was required to complete papers concerning the
child's father, an allegedly "absent parent."'9 7 At the appointment, Mrs. V.
remonstrated about "hard times" and pleaded to know "when is the baby
going to be added to the budget[?]" 98 The worker retorted that "the baby is
86. Id. at 24, 26.
87. Mrs. V. testified "So, she just told me I have to wait as she hanged up, so I hanged up." Id.
at 24.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 24. Mrs. V. ordered her daughter's birth certificate when she "checked out" of the
hospital on August 18, 1986. She testified: "I told them to give me the letter stating that the baby
was born and then I told them how long the Birth Certificate was gonna take.... that it was gonna
take three weeks to a month." Id. at 24-25.
90. Id. at 27-28.

91. Id. at 28.
92. Id. at 29.
93. Id. 27-29. Mrs. V. stated: "They didn't accept it. They told me they weren't going to take it,
to call my worker." Id. at 30.
94. Id. Recertification interviews required by federal and state public welfare statutes are commonly referred to as "face-to face" interviews.
95. Id. at 30-31.
96. Id. at 3 1.
97. Id. On welfare families and child support, see Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families:
Family Policy Trapped in Its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 619 (1987-88).
98. Record at 31.
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already added to the budget[,]" noting that by Mrs. V.'s "November check,
the baby should be already added." 99
B.

MILK, PAMPERS, AND COMMUNITY

To survive during these months of deprivation, Mrs. V. relied on a
monthly public assistance grant of $374.40 and a monthly food stamp allotment of $122. Because those meager sums were inadequate to support herself and her daughter,1 00 especially given a monthly rent of $256.68,101 she
turned to a community of family and friends for aid.' 0 2 The aid came in the
form of loans.103

The lending began in July, 1986 when Mrs. V. solicited $63.68 from a
friend to meet a rent shortfall. It continued in September and October, 1986
when she borrowed $250 from another friend to satisfy two months of outstanding rent and to finance the purchase of "a small crib and some clothing."' 04 This and other purchases associated with the care and feeding of her
daughter consumed the great bulk of the lending. 0 5
These regular purchases, outlays for milk and Pampers, compelled Mrs. V.
to seek out loans from six different friends or family members. The loan
amounts ranged from $20 to $100 and reached a total of $280. Even the
proprietor from the corner grocery store extended credit, in the amount of
$73, to pay for food stuffs.106
The generosity of friends and family soon proved insufficient. Alarmed by
the ongoing need for "milk and Pampers and food," Mrs. V. pawned her
wedding ring. Later, she sold her jewelry, a gold chain. At the end of seven
months, Mrs. V.'s accrued debts, coupled with the loss of her jewelry,
99. Id.
100. For a discussion of the inadequacy of public welfare budgets and the socio-economics of
homelessness, see Dehavenon, Administrative Closings of PublicAssistance Cases: The Rise of Hunger and Homelessness in New York City, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 741 (1987-88);
Morawetz, Welfare Litigation to Prevent Homelessness, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. &. Soc. CHANGE 565
(1987-88); Recent Developments, Between Helping the Child and Punishing the Mother: Homelessness Among AFDC Families, 12 HARV.WOMEN'S L.J. 237 (1989); Rossi, The Family, Welfare and
Homelessness, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281 (1989); Sullivan & Damrosch,
Homeless Women and Children, in THE HOMELESS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 82-98 (R. Bingham, R. Green, & S. White eds. 1987).
101. This rent amount did not include gas and electricity. Record at 3.

102. Id. at 34-40.
103. Id. The agency made no determination whether Mrs. V. incurred overpayments due to
receipt of loan monies. For a discussion of public welfare overpayment recoupment provisions,
Failinger, Contract, Gift, or Covenant? A Review of the Law of Overpayments, 36 Loy. L. REV.
(1990).
104. Record at 35-37.
105. Id. at 36-40.
106. Id. A seventh friend lent Mrs. V. $55.00 to supply her with "money to travel[ ]" to
hospital when her daughter contracted meningitis. Id. at 38-39.

the
see
89

the
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amounted to $851.68.1"7
C.

SPEAKING OUT

When no remedial action had occurred by the middle of November, 1986,
Mrs. V. called the IM worker to dispute the claims, repeated "over and over
again," that her daughter was to be added to the household public benefits
budget. 10 8 The worker rejoined that "whenever the computer picks her up,
that's when she'll be added." 109 Dissatisfied, Mrs. V. asked the worker to
"give [her] the number for a fair hearing." 110 The worker replied "you want
it, you get it yourselfl,]" and hung up."'
In December, 1986, on the advice of her sister-in-law, Mrs. V. visited the
local welfare client advocacy organization."12 Consulting with the director,
she described "what had happened." '" 3 The director resolved to conduct an
immediate investigation by contacting Center officials. Acting as Mrs. V.'s
lay advocate, the director called the IM worker, the IM supervisor, and the
Center director."

14

Initially, the calls proved fruitless. 1 5 But with persistence, the director
shortly reached Mrs. V.'s IM worker and asked "why the baby still wasn't
added [.1"',16 The IM worker answered: "'cause of the computer error,"
contending that "when the computer.., picks up the baby, then the baby
will be added." 117 Addressing Mrs. V. harshly, the worker adamantly rei8
peated: "when the computer picks it up, the baby will be added.""
On or about January 13, 1987, the Center redefined Mrs. V.'s public assistance and food stamp household to include her daughter, recomputed her
monthly grant and allotment, and issued full benefits. Having suffered a
three month delay in the issuance of public benefits and accumulated a substantial debt, Mrs. V. requested an administrative law judge (ALJ)hearing
107. Id.at 8, 40-41.
108. Id. at 32.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. For an analysis of client community-based advocacy organizations, see Rosenblum, Controlling the Bureaucracy of the AntiPoverty Programs,31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 190-91 (1986)
(describing the British Citizens' Advice Bureau as a means of ensuring bureaucratic accountability).
Cf D. LEWIS, J. GRANT, & D. ROSENBLUM, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REFORM: CRIME
PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS (1988) (analyzing community and cultural context of collective action).
113. Record at 32-33.
114. Id. at 33.
115. In a frustrating series of phone calls, the director learned that the IM worker "wasn't in,"
the IM supervisor "wasn't in yet," and the Center director was "at a conference." Id.
116. Id.

117. Id.
118. Id.
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from the New York State Department of Social Services seeking the full restoration of benefits retroactive to August, 1986 and the reimbursement of all
out-of-pocket expenses. 119
D.

SPEAKING OUT OF TURN

In January, 1987, Mrs. V. retained the neighborhood legal aid office as
counsel. Assigned to the case for the purpose of hearing representation, I
visited the Center to review Mrs. V.'s case file. 120 Reading the file, I learned
that on or about October 23, 1986, the IM worker directed the reclassification of Mrs. V.'s public assistance household to compensate for the birth of
her daughter. Additionally I found that when the directive was not implemented in the ensuing two months, the IM worker issued a second reclassification directive on December 19, 1986. This directive was processed on
December 30, 1986.121
At the hearing, Mrs. V. and a representative from the New York City
Human Resources Administration appeared and testified.12 2 Mrs. V. opened
her testimony by reciting the composition and financial circumstances of her
household. Thereafter, she carefully recounted the events leading up to and
123
following her application for public welfare benefits.
Recalling these events, Mrs. V. asserted that IM workers never offered to
issue her emergency public assistance or food stamps. 124 Furthermore, she
noted that they never proffered help in verifying her daughter's birth. She
pointed out, for example, that the workers never called, contacted, or investigated her doctor, clinic, or hospital. Beyond vague mention of a computer
error by a worker on one occasion, Mrs. V. stated she received no explana119. Id. at 11-12.
120. On-site physical inspection and review is appropriate not only for the purpose of investigation, but also to uncover client fraud and present client perjury. For a restatement of the problem
of client fraud, see Hazard, Rectification of Client Fraud:Death and Revival of a ProfessionalNorm,
33 EMORY L.J. 271 (1984). Hazard poses the problem in this way: "What should a lawyer be
permitted or required to do when he learns that the client's project is fraudulent at a point when it is
simply too late for innocuous withdrawal?" Id. at 291. By way of resolution, he recommends a
formula consolidating prevention and rectification, but requiring warning where practicable. Id. at
308-09.
For a review of disclosure requirements, see Redlich, Disclosure Provisionsof the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 981 (commending disclosure provisions of the
Model Rules); Wolfram, ClientPerjury- The Kutak Commission and the Association of Trial Lawyers
on Lawyers, Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 964 (juxtaposing
proposals requiring disclosure of client perjury).
121. Record at 10-11, 14.
122. Id. at 1. The New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA or the agency) is a
local arm of the New York State Department of Social Services (NYSDDS or the State).
123. Id. 2-4, 17-44.
124. See Note, Meeting Short-Term Needs of Poor Families: Emergency Assistance for Needy
Families with Children, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 879 (1975) (reviewing administration and procedures
governing availability of emergency assistance relief).
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tion for the Center's failure to add her child to the household budget.125
Mrs. V. next testified regarding the protracted struggle to add her infant
daughter to the household budget. The testimony included a detailed description of the numerous bureaucratic obstacles impeding that addition. At
the close of this testimony, Mrs. V. summarized the nature of her petition for
reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. Interrupted by skeptical ALJ
questioning discounting her right to such a reimbursement, Mrs. V.1became
27
indignant. 126 Confronting the ALJ,she demanded: "Can I speak?"
Apparently surprised by her outburst, the ALJ withheld his questioning,
permitting Mrs. V. to speak without intrusion. The complete text of her
statement is set down below.
To tell you the truth, first of all,... my worker, I can't speak with the lady,
because every time I try to talk to her, she's a very rude and nasty person.
So, how can I-if I can't-if she can't add my baby to the budget, how can
I go and explain to her, which they should know by themself, that I need
food and Pampers for my daughter. And, after they have-I let her know
when I called up that I didn't have anything at all for my baby. That
day-and I find out that they're supposed to give me clothes-at least,
money to buy the baby clothes. So, how can I go to my worker when she
always hanging up on me or don't want to talk to me and tell her that I had
to go out of my way to borrow money from people or pawn or sell my-my
jewelry which ...
I didn't have to.
I think we have [suffered hardship]. 'Cause just what-what [my worker]
has put me through and the time my daughter was in the hospital and I
was broke and I-and I had to go back and forth walking and the day I
took her into the emergency that I was walking to the hospital...
'Cause I didn't have no money. And, the time-it says it even on the papers the time that I had sold my jewelry that I had to go out of my way I
think that nobody has to go through that or sell jewelry or sell my personal8
belongings when the welfare is supposed to add the baby to the budget.12
125. Record at 32-33.
126. Id.at 17-44. On the importance of indignation in the progress of the woman's suffrage
movement of the nineteenth century, see Edwards, Women and the Law: From Abigail to Sandra, 52
U. CIN.

L. REV. 967, 972 (1983). See also S.

BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN

AND RAPE

375-404 (1975) (describing feminist strategies opposing sexual assault and rape); S.

NICHOLAS,

A.

PRICE,

& R.

RUBIN,

RIGHTS AND WRONGS: WOMEN'S STRUGGLE FOR LEGAL

EQUALITY 3-22 (1986) (tracing women's
1 YALE J.L. AND FEMINISM 101 (1989).

suffrage movement); West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory,

127. Record at 42. In confronting the ALJ, Mrs. V. seems to challenge his implicit claim to
authoritative interpretation of her asserted right to reimbursement. See Cover, supra note 66, at 53.
128. Record at 42-44. On June 3, 1987, the AL rendered a decision directing the agency to
issue Mrs. V. public assistance and Medicaid retroactive to August 12, 1986, and food stamps retro-
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THE ETHIC OF RESISTANCE

The indignant declaration which concludes Mrs. V.'s hearing signifies
more than a denunciation of callous bureaucratic treatment. Viewed
broadly, it suggests a powerful, albeit inchoate, stance of public resistance to
both judicial and lawyer authority. Concedely, the umbrage Mrs. V. directs
at the ALJ appears to be a plainer statement of resistance. Yet, the statement "Can I speak?" carries sufficient ambiguity to warrant the suspicion
that Mrs. V. may have aimed her remark at lawyer authority as well. Extending this analysis is perhaps appropriate to interpreting her remark as
something larger, a kind of public uprising against the form and substance of
lawyer storytelling. Even on this interpretation, Mrs. V.'s declaration is a
starker and more boldly asserted example of resistance than generally might
be found in the poverty law context. In the suppressive confines of the poverty lawyer's practice, client resistance is likely to be marshalled narrowly
and obliquely. Even when resistance is shown, however, it is slighted by the
poverty lawyer as insignificant. This evasion is attributable to the ethic of
29

suppression. 1

Diagnosing the fallacies in this lawyer ethic demands alternative structures
of rationality. Here I propose two such structures: detachment and connection. 130 Both detachment and connection are singular "moments-of-knowing.'

.13 1

Coupled together, they enable the poverty lawyer to discover the

falsity of client dependence and isolation, and the existence of autonomy and
community.
Detachment furnishes the poverty lawyer a means of separating from practices which privilege a subordinated vision of the client. 132 Discarding privileged recordings of the history of client advocacy is essential to safeguarding
active to September 11, 1986. The period of restoration extended to December, 1986 with benefits
computed to offset prior grants and allotments. The AUJ declined to order agency reimbursement
of out-of-pocket expenses citing insufficient statutory authority. In re Josephine V., Decision After
Fair Hearing (State of N.Y. Dept. of Soc. Serv. June 3, 1987), slip op. at 4.
129. On claims of necessity broached by various forms of rationality, see M. FOUCAULT, Reason

to Tell the Truth, in

FOUCAULT LIVE,

supra note 8, at 252.

130. For a discussion of detachment under historical frameworks of knowledge, see M. FouCAULT, Historian of Culture, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 79. Cf Postema, Self-Image,
Integrity, and ProfessionalResponsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 11, at 286, 293 (noting
that detachment offers an excuse but not a justification for professional irresponsibility).
Elizabeth Flynn supplements this discussion by seeking to integrate detachment and involvement
in order to reach a comprehensive viewpoint. Flynn, Genderand Reading, in GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at 267, 268-70 (defining detachment as "observation from a distance").
131. Lahey, " . . Until Women Themselves Have Told All That They Have to Tell.
, 23
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 519, 535 (1985).
132. The step outside of prevailing logic may be likened to an act of self-refutation. See Miller,
The Glittering Eye of Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 880, 896-98 (1986) (reviewing J. VINING, THE AuTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986)).
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the potential for client autonomy. 133 Without such revision, the self-evidence
34
of client dependency remains a compelling memory.1
Of course, detachment can never be complete. There is no transcendent
state guaranteeing critical detachment. Similarly, there is no perfect insight
into structures of rationality or discourse. But, detachment may allow for
the emergence of shared meanings institutionalized in alternative roles and
practices. 135 That transfiguration yields a counter-ethic of resistance.
36
The ethic of resistance challenges the rationality of lawyer suppression. 1
The ethic is not reducible to a legalistic rule, 137 but is instead demonstrated
through the practices of voice and story. 138 These alternative practices are
exhibited in Mrs. V.'s struggle to maintain autonomy and community connection. The practices speak in opposition not only to judicial and bureaucratic authority, but also to the authority of the poverty lawyer.
The voice of resistance tells the story of individual clients connected by
interdependent narratives of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexuality. The
conception of the connected self locates each client within social networks.
133. Cognitive research shows memory and comprehension to be based on the same generalized
knowledge structures. Crawford & Chaffin, The Reader's Construction of Meaning: Cognitive Research on Gender and Comprehension, in GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at 3, 5.
134. On popular memory, see M. FOUCAULT, Film and Popular Memory, in FOUCAULT LIVE,
supra note 8, at 89-106. Cf Cornell, Post-Structuralism,the Ethical Relation, and the Law, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1587, 1623 (1988) ("When we recall the past, we inevitably remember the future.").
135. See Cornell, Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions of Community in the Law: The
Problem of Normative Authority in Legal Interpretation,54 TENN. L. REV. 327, 328 (1987) ("It is
precisely because we are in a shared world of institutionalized meaning that critique as well as
agreement is possible.").
136. The upshot of this challenge is likely to be suspicion. See Freedman, Lawyer-Client Confidences and the Constitution, (Book Review) 90 YALE L.J. 1486, 1496 (1981) (reviewing M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980)) ("[Olne of the costs of destroying confidence and trust between
lawyers and clients is that lawyers would lose the opportunity to give sound legal and moral advice
based on full knowledge of the matters entrusted to them.").
137. For a discussion of an alternative rhetoric of professional aspiration based on a classical
form of normative instruction denoted by education through illuminating example, see Hazard,
Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and ProfessionalAspirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 571, 575-76 (1982).
Asserting that "the legal profession has come to put too much weight on codes and rules as the
medium of discourse about professional ethics[,]" Hazard endorses Thomas Shaffer's use of the
method of illuminating narrative. See Hazard, Book Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 396
(1988) (reviewing T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987)). Hazard asserts "[n]arrative
reveals dimensions of events that rules cannot. These dimensions at a minimum include specification of the social context in which an ethical dilemma arises and the identity and character of the
participants." Id.
138. Hazard maintains that "[a] story can reveal to us moral aspects of life that otherwise are
simply inaccessible." Hazard, Book Review, supra note 60, at 398. The ethical truth of story telling
is undertaken by indirect demonstration. Id. at 393. Hazard explains that a story "engages the
reader in the situation and, having done so, induces him into reflection to 'solve' or make sense of
the events portrayed." Id. Learning occurs in the attempt to construct an interpretation when "no
single interpretation of a situation is the only interpretation, and no single answer entirely complete." Id.
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For Martha Minow, individual membership in connected networks helps to
constitute the I. On this view, individual "belonging is essential to
139
becoming."
Recognizing collective networks of resistance is indispensable to recapturing the omitted stories of clients. 14° The actualization of resistance in the
daily actions of ordinary clients proves that dissenting interpretations of the
world may become real. 14 1 Overlooking those interpretations denies clients
the opportunity to assemble a coherent narrative adequate to contest dominant lawyer narrative. It is the norm of resistance, manifested in word and
deed, 142 that provokes events around which alternative narrative coherence
may coalesce. 143
Client narratives of resistance are disclosed in conversation with the poverty lawyer. 144 Hans-Georg Gadamer urges "no higher principle than holding oneself open in a conversation." 14 5 To hold himself open in conversation,
the poverty lawyer must grasp the "common structure of understanding and
playing."' 4 6 Gadamer asserts that meaning grows in "playful fashion" from
the value of words spoken in concrete situations.' 47 The non-fixity and constant play of meaning is for Gadamer the ongoing game in which "being48
with-others" occurs. 1
Conversation commences with the poverty lawyer's offer to play with privileged and subordinated meanings of autonomy/dependence and isolation/
community. 149 The intent of this offer is to preempt suppression.1 50 Pre139. Minow, supra note 58, at 894 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 821.
141. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1617-29 (1986).
142. Id. at 1618.
143. For a discussion of narrative coherence in jurisprudential contexts, see Van Roermund,
Narrative Coherence and the Guises of Legalism, in LAW, INTERPRETATION AND REALITY: ESSAYS
IN EPISTEMOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND JURISPRUDENCE 310, 342 (P. Nerhot ed. 1990).
144. Jacobson expands the parameters of conversation to include non-speech acts. On his view,
"[c]ommunication is textured and various. It need not even include speech, certainly not rational
discourse, so long as it expresses information calculated to change the understanding (in some way)
of an addressee of the communication." Jacobson, supra note 70, at 1664-65.
145. H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 47, at 189. See also D. COOLE, supra note 42, at 267 (commenting on the valuable "creation of a new set of meanings and referents which differ from, and
circumscribe, men's knowledge").
146. H.-G. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 56 (D. Linge trans. 1976).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Play refers to the play of perspective. Perspective "signifies the capacity for certain insights
as well as the limitation of vision." GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at xxi.
Introducing the element of play does not deny that the creation of the lawyer-client relationship
carries significant legal consequences worthy of safeguard through legal formalities. Cf Fineman,
Law and Changing Patternsof Behavior: Sanctions on Non-MaritalCohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV.
275, 326 (mentioning the symbolic legitimacy and protections acquired by attaching legal formalities to cohabitation).
150. Pre-emption assumes the open acknowledgement of lawyer-client mistrust. Play, in turn,
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emption seeks to disrupt the logic of suppression in the hope of re-aligning
hierarchical structures of rationality and discourse.' 51
While the offer of play may echo an offer of friendship, the two are distinct. 152 Play neither invites nor requires friendship. At best, play temporarily displaces the rationality and discourse of suppression. Displacement
5 3
kindles a process of reconstituting the client as subject.'
offers an opportunity for the sustained exploration of alternative grounds for mutual trust. For a
careful probing of lawyer-client mistrust, see Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client,
69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981).
151. For a discussion of the realignment of patriarchal epistemology and discourse, see Burns,
Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 194 (1990) (rejecting the practicality of using feminist litigation as a vehicle for dialogue); Colker, FeministLitigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990) (proposing the incorporation of the feminist voice of
dialogue in constitutional litigation); Griffith, Sexism, Language, And The Law, 91 W. VA. L. REV.
125, 143-46 (1988) (urging self-reflective action to transform the language of the law by changing
the identity of the speakers, the content of the stories related, and the metaphors and descriptive
terminology used); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42, at 30 (exploring the epistemology of women's
exclusion: the distinctive ways of knowing gleaned from the everyday experience of exclusion);
Phinney, Feminism, Epistemology, and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading Bowen v. Gilliard, 12 HARV.
WOMEN's L.J. 151, 179 (1989) (approving a dialogic rhetoric of intersubjectivity that "attempts to
grasp, through an act of imaginative identification, the situation of the victim.") (footnote omitted);
Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence:An Agenda for Research, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 521, 523 (1987)
(approaching gender as a category of contextual analysis); Wishik, To Question Everything: The
Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 68 (1985) (asserting that feminist jurisprudence must go beyond attempting to include women in patriarchal categories; it must
question the "methods, and scope of inquiry, the categories which structure how questions are
formed, and the rules which both legitimize sources of information and govern modes of interpretation."); Young, Difference and Policy: Some Reflections in the Context of New Social Movements, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 545 (1987) (espousing a politics of difference defined by "particularity, specificity, and the impossibility of reducing either social process or individual subjectivity to unity.");
Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Poweron Whose Terms? (Book Review), 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1559,
1563 (1987) (citing the existence of contradictory truths as integral to women's experience and
knowledge).
152. Thomas Shaffer propounds friendship as an alternative professional ethic. Shaffer, The Ethics of Dissent and Friendshipin the American Professions, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 623 (1986). Lawyers
guided by this dissenting ethic "seek to practice the virtue of friendship with their clients." Id. at
638. For Shaffer, practicing the ethics of friendship raises a moral issue of preference resolved by
the circumstances of community. Id. at 643, 662. In this sense, "the community teaches the professional how to be a friend." Id. at 662. See also Fried, The Lawyer as a Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (defining friendship as the adoption
of client interests).
Cf Selinger, "The Ethics of Dissent and Friendship"-A Response to ProfessorShaffer, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 666 (1986) (approving professional detachment as a reflection of diversity and independence); Friedberg, A Comment for Tom Shaffer: The Ethics of Race, the Ethics of Corruption, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 670 (1986) (objecting to Shaffer's ethic of friendship and community as unresponsive to
racial prejudice, corruption, and favoritism); Dauer and Leff, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 573
(1977).
153. On the discourse of truth and the constitution of the self, see M. FOUCAULT, Reason to Tell
the Truth, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 253-54 ("If I 'tell the truth' about myself, I constitute myself as subject by a certain number of relationships of power, which weigh upon me and
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Reconstitution generates consideration of alternative possibilities of individual and collective client resistance. 154 Refashioning these possibilities
from long-developed strategies of client resistance resembles a seizure of
power over the process of poverty law advocacy. Seizure is crucial to normative reclamation.
Recognizing this importance, many feminists argue that in renouncing the
patriarchal conditions of oppression which produce resistance, women at the
same time must reclaim the normative underpinnings of such strategies.
These feminists therefore endorse a continued devotion to caring for the
needs of others and facilitating the bonds of community, in spite of the subjugating history of this ethic. 155 Applied here, that endorsement gives positive
meaning to the subordinated social text of the client's world.
The rescuing of client resistance strategies demonstrates the potential for
the normative inversion of the ethic of suppression.15 6 This potential encomwhich I lay upon others."). See also McGuire, Moral Relativism and Habermas, 6 ALSA F. 23
(1982) (charting the development of political autonomy and moral discourse).
154. Reconstitution neither ratifies nor ignores the inequalities dividing the lawyer-client relation. Eschewing both paternalism and antipaternalism, reconstitution seeks to replace the isolation
of individualism with the solidarity of community. For a study of paternalism and anti-paternalism
in feminist theory and practice, see Olsen, From False Paternalismto False Equality: JudicialAssaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1518, 1522 (1986).
155. See Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism
Unmodified, (Book Review) 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 352, 379 (1988) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW (1987)).
156. For an exposition of feminist legal practice as an alternative normative culture, see Littleton, supra note 42, at 1300 (claiming that practice empowering women or contributing to the
breakdown of male domination enhances equality); Menkel-Meadow, The ComparativeSociology of
Women Lawyers: The "Feminization" of the Legal Profession, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 897, 914
(1986) (suggesting that application of the female form of moral reasoning to the legal process might
spur different processes, such as mediation, and produce different substantive solutions); MenkelMeadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of
Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 289, 304 (1989) (calling for a redirection of
legal profession research to get inside the content, definition, and structure of work in order to find
how particular conceptions of work are reinforced and encoded); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42,
at 39 (exploring how women's different voices may affect the lawyering process); Schultz, Room to
Maneuver (f)or a Room of One's Own? Practice Theory and Feminist Practice, 14 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 123, 141-42, 145 (1989) (chiding feminist practice theory for underestimating connection
between gender hierarchies and women's oppression, and prodding feminists to articulate stories of
oppression as well as counter-normative visions).
Compare Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 23 (1988) (arguing that "women's inclinations for activities of care will necessarily be frustrated as they encounter the law's
limitations") with Standford, Lawgirls and Cowgirls, 10 LEGAL STUD. F. 283 (1986) (contemplating
women's practices of self-empowerment) and Foster, Antigones in the Bar: Women Lawyers as
Reluctant Adversaries, 10 LEGAL STUD. F. 287 (1986) (exploring the consequences and contributions of an ethic of care).
For criticism of feminist practice and culture on grounds of false universalism and ethnocentric
sociology, see C. SMART, supra note 8, at 66-89 (assailing grand theorizing in feminist jurisprudence
as a celebration of positivistic, scientific feminism replacing one hierarchy of truth with another); E.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); R.
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passes both rationality and discourse suggesting "a way of being, thinking,
I 57
and speaking that allows for openness, plurality, diversity, and difference."'
Fulfilling that potential demands an end to the trivialization of client stories
and strategies of resistance' 58 and the beginning of a participatory poverty
law practice. 159 The purpose of such participatory practice is twofold: first,
to improve the quality of ethical lawyering1 6° and second, to enable clients to
assert their autonomy consonant with community.
Admittedly, unrestrained autonomy threatens the dissolution of community and the accompanying isolation of the individual client. 161 This result is
in part the consequence of employing a liberal, rather than a feminist, notion
of autonomy. 162 Under liberal theory, autonomy is defined by the rugged
independence of atomized individuals competing in society.163 By compariTONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 217-33 (1989) (citing anti-essentialism of post-modern feminism and deconstruction); Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (gender essentialism may silence the voices of Black
women); Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989)
(examining the diversity of women's experiences of oppression and the inadequate treatment of race
as a discrete category of oppression); Ashe, Conversation and Abortion (Book Review), 82 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 387 (1988) (reviewing M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)).
157. R. TONG, supra note 156, at 219.
158. See Cornell, Post-Structuralism,the Ethical Relation, and the Law, supra note 134, at 1588
(defining the ethical relation of otherness as safeguarding difference and singularity).
159. Foucault emphasizes that liberty is a practice. M. FOUCAULT, An Ethics of Pleasure, in
FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 264. Its effective exercise is guaranteed not by institutions or
laws, but by the safeguarding projects of people participating in their own freedom. Id. at 257, 26566.
160. Douglas Rosenthal's empirical study of personal injury practice showed that an active, participatory model of the lawyer-client relationship produced "significantly better" results in the settlement and trial of claims. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 7, at 61.
161. Commenting on this peril, Martha Minow avers: "Freedom may mean freedom to choose
isolation, but then it must also mean freedom to choose connection." Minow, Consider the Consequences (Book Review), 84 MICH. L. REV. 900, 916 (1986) (reviewing L. WEITZMAN, THE DI-

VORCE

REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985)). See also L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA

374-75 (1985) (documenting the rise of individualism in the traditional concept of marriage). Cf
Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656, 1687-90 (1986) (reconceiving modernist isolation in terms of mistrust and strife).
162. For a penetrating critique of liberal individualism, see Cornell, Toward a Modern!
Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985).
163. The liberal tradition propounds a model of insular autonomy. Cover, supra note 66, at 33
("People associate not only to transform themselves, but also to change the social world in which
they live."). See also H. GANS, MIDDLE AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (1988); C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:

HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
For recent communitarian accounts of the modern liberal subject, see A. MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS

OF JUSTICE (1982); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Freeden, Human Rights and
Welfare. A Communitarian View, 100 ETHICS 489 (1990); Binder, Mastery. Slavery, and Emancipation, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435 (1989); Nino, The Communitarian Challenge to Liberal Rights, 8
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son, under feminist theory, autonomy is tied to community and the associated values of nurturing, care, love, and empathy. 164
Reinvigorating the meaning of autonomy in a manner congruent with
165
community requires the renewed contemplation of client's role and world.
When social roles are interpreted in terms of human interdependence and
interaction, autonomy and community are complementary. 166 This integration is consistent with a feminist-defined notion of self-determination conceived in light of connection.167
Using the value of connection 68 as a cantilever to join autonomy and community expands the content of lawyer rationality. This expansion entails the
inclusion of different forms of rationality and discourse at play in the diverse
communities of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexuality. 169 As Foucault
notes, play between different social groups can construct, rationalize, and
170
organize old usages and forms of behavior in new and unforseen ways.
Client-participatory forms of rationality and discourse undermine the lawLAW & PHIL. 37 (1989); West, The AuthoritarianImpulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 531 (1988); Cornell, In Union: A Critical Review of TOWARD A PERFECTED STATE (Book
Review), 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1089, 1091-94 (1987) (reviewing P. WEISS, TOWARD A PERFECTED

(1986)).
164. West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65 (1988). See also, S. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989) (dismissing the false gender neutrality of contemporary
liberal theory); Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990) (exploring ways
that feminists have tried to join political agendas with methodology).
165. Deciphering gender roles in communities, Lucinda Finley asserts that "power, domination,
and the consequent social construction of gender roles affect choice and the configuration of community." Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Justice in the Search for Gender Justice (Book Review), 96 YALE L. J. 914, 923 (1987) (reviewing D. KIRP, M. YUDOF, & M. FRANKS, GENDER
JUSTICE (1986)).
166. Finley, supra note 165, at 931. Compare Cornell, Institutionalizationof Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potentialfor Transformative Legal Interpretation,supra note 62, at 1143
(pronouncing the Hegelian understanding of community as the reality of internal interrelatedness);
Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 319, 325 (1987) ("The real challenge to autonomy as a doctrine is the ordinary fact that the person comes to be in relationships-in
families, congregations, communities, friendships, and associations.") (emphasis in original).
167. Finley, supra note 165, at 933. Finley does not address the concept of self-respect as a
condition of self-determination, though the two seem intertwined. For consideration of subjective
and objective measures of self-respect, see Massey, Is Self-Respect a Moral or Psychological ConSTATE

cept?, 93 ETHICS 246 (1983).

168. Robin West asserts the central insight of recent feminist theory to be the vision of women as
"'essentially connected,' not 'essentially separate,' from the rest of human life, both materially,
through pregnancy, intercourse and breast-feeding, and existentially, through the moral and practical life." West, supra note 164, at 3.
169. On the social meanings of association, assimilation, and difference arising out of membership in empowered and disempowered groups, see Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw.
U.L. REV. 106 (1986).
170. Foucault calls this level of analysis strategic configurations. He insists "[t]here's no person
or group, no titular head of this strategy; but beginning from effects different from their initial end
and from the capacity to utilize these effects, a certain number of strategies are formed." M. FouCAULT, What Call for Punishment?, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 284.

1991]

SPEAKING OUT OF TURN

yer-client relation as a field of power. As the field collapses, individual acts
of resistance furnish organizing principles for the formation of an alternative
relational order. Long neglected or underestimated, those acts are symbolic
7
of the client subject asserting a practice of resistance.'1
Deducing techniques of lawyering from an ethic of resistance in order to
enhance client autonomy without sacrificing community or reinscribing subordination promises a slow and arduous labor. 172 Here, I suggest only that
such labor begin with the investigation of how the client survives and overturns the ethic of lawyer suppression. 7 3 Learning how and why the client
rallies the force to assert her autonomous status as subject, to speak out of
turn, is vital to the establishment of a new ethic of resistance. 174 By learning
this lesson well, lawyers may spur the increased participation of excluded
175
client communities in the advocacy process.
171. Foucault's practices of the self resemble practices of resistance. He explains:
Sometimes these practices are associated with numerous, systematic, and restrictive kinds
of codings. Sometimes they even lose almost all definition, to the profit of a set of rules
which then appears as the essential of a morality. But it can also happen that they constitute the most important and the most active source of the morality, and that it is around
them that reflection develops. The practices of the self thus take the form of an art of the
self, relatively independent of any moral legislation.
M. FOUCAULT, The Concern for Truth, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 293, 298-99.
172. In this labor, the reconstitution and subordination of the client subject occurs simultaneously. Cf M. FOUCAULT, Concernfor the Truth, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 300 (defending the thesis of two distinctly different, albeit simultaneous as well as successive experiences of
madness: internment and medical practice). See also M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION
(1977).
Lawyer participation in stimulating and sustaining acts of resistance is essential to the remaking
of the character, culture and language of poverty law. Cf. White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's
Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 871-95 (1983) (positing the interconnection between rhetoric and character).
173. See D. GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY 271 (1988) (on the self-appropriation of the legal subject).

174. Foucault contends that "the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a
more anonymous way, through practices of liberation, of freedom[.]" M. FOUCAULT, An Aesthetics
of Existence, in FOUCAULT LIVE, supra note 8, at 309, 313. Cf Schibanoff, Taking the Gold out of
Egypt: The Art of Reading as a Woman, in GENDER AND READING, supra note 17, at 83-101 (on
the transformation of the emasculated female reader).
175. The active participation of client groups or whole communities in the advocacy process may
invite prohibitions for the unauthorized practice of law. For a discussion of the disparate impact of
these prohibitions on those (i.e., the poor) lacking adequate self-help skills or access to legal assistance, see Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Unauthorized PracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981); Project, The UnauthorizedPractice
of Law and Pro Se Divorce; An EmpiricalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976).
Furthermore, participation raises the issue whether lawyer responsibility to promote the campaigns of individual clients should be codified and mandated. See, e.g., Drinan, Untying the White
Noose (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 435, 443 (1984) (reviewing J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DiSCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION (1983))
("The writings on ethical norms and standards of professional conduct for lawyers seldom, if ever,
talk about the responsibility of lawyers to promote integrated housing."). Cf Elster, Rationality,
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CONCLUSION

The ethic of resistance celebrates the inclusion of client voice and story in
the advocacy process. It rejects specious analytic dichotomies (e.g., independence/dependence, and isolation/community) in favor of the historical categories of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexuality. Applying these
categories to the practical activities of poverty law advocacy, the ethic seeks
to reconstruct the lawyer-client experience.
Even when reconstruction fails, the silence of excluded voices and stories is
not an intransigent feature of ethical lawyering. Silence merely indicates the
transitory dominance of a privileged rationality and discourse. Reconstituting ethical lawyering to liberate client narrative is a continuing critical
enterprise.
This is not to suggest that the field of ethical lawyering has evolved without the acute proddings of criticism. To be sure, the expanding literature of
ethics reveals formidable critique. 176 Thus far, the critique has failed to decenter the dominant ethic of suppression.
The telling and retelling of client stories frames a new stance from which
to assay the ethics of poverty law practice. Because the relation between a
poverty lawyer and an impoverished client is woven in story, I have begun
my critique in this context. 177 Basic to the vitality of this critique project is
Morality, and Collective Action, 96 ETHICS 136 (1985) (considering the norms and motivations for
collective action).
Whether failure to abide by that responsibility establishes grounds for discipline, and moreover,
what procedures might govern such disciplinary proceedings must be left for later inquiries.
176. Critique has arisen from many stations. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 19, at 653-66, 667-85,
686 (1981) (describing the market and legitimation functions of the Model Rules, and disparaging
their ethical claims as internally inconsistent, linguistically meaningless, empirically false, and prescriptively impossible); Elkins, Essay Review, The Reconstruction of Legal Ethics as Ethics, 35 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 274, 283 (1986) ("Ethics cannot, if we are to avoid the entangling net of personal and
social deception of the traditional professional ethos, exist without a critical perspective.") (footnote
omitted); Rhode, supra note 31, (upbraiding regulatory structure of the legal profession and selfinterest of ethical codes).
Practitioners have also mounted criticism. See, e.g., Kasanof, The Hazardsof Legal Ethics: Two
Views (Book Review), 89 YALE L.J. 1438, 1439 (1980) (reviewing G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW (1978)) (assailing Hazard's advice as "utterly unhelpful to the attorney who
needs guidance in his quest for ethical conduct.").
Academics located in adjacent disciplines, e.g., anthropology, have leveled a broader criticism.
See, e.g., Nader, Serving Self Not Others (Book Review), 89 YALE L.J. 1442, 1444 (1980) (reviewing G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978)) ("The [Hazard] book reflects the
specialized practitioner's passion for technical skill-a value that seems to override what most people think the central purpose of law should be: a more just society.").
177. Doubtless there are numerous contexts which provide fertile ground for further critique.
See, e.g., Brenner, Albert H. Scharrer:An Anecdotal Explorationof the Practiceof CriminalLaw in
Dayton, Ohio Between 1910 and 1950, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV. 563 (1989) (examining the social and
legal milieu surrounding Scharrer's career as a prosecutor and defense attorney); Flemming, Client
Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 253 (exploring lawyer accountability to and control of private and public criminal
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the willingness to shed the absolutist faith in the tradition of poverty law
practice and the essentialist belief in a dependent and isolated client world.
Neither faith nor illusion, of course, is dispassionately surrendered. What is
required therefore is a normative and empirical strategy of reexamining and
reconstituting the dominant system of ethical lawyering. For clients who
speak out of turn, and for those who remain still silent, the lawyer's ethic of
suppression is no longer satisfactory. The search for an alternative ethic, and
ethic of resistance, is the ongoing collective project of poverty lawyers and
impoverished clients.

clients); Hazard, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Book Review), 95 YALE L.J. 1523, 1534-35 (1986)
(reviewing K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1985)) ("Lawyers cannot pretend that
their duty as advocates to stay 'within the bounds of the law' extends only as far as a violation of
that duty can be proved in court."); Kritzer, supra note 7 (describing corporate lawyer-client relations as multifaceted encompassing professional, business, and social dimensions); Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J.
1603 (1989) (challenging traditional understanding of the lawyer-client relationship in the context
of section 1983 litigation); Luban, A Fierce Blindness (Book Review), 5 CRIM. JUST. ETHICs 69
(1986) (reviewing K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS

AT WORK (1985)) (deflating the rococo moral strategies of white-collar defense attorneys in New
York City); Shaffer & Shaffer, Characterand Community: Rispetto as a Virtue in the Tradition of
Italian-AmericanLawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 (1989) (considering the Italian-American
virtues of dignity and self-respect displayed in lawyering); Wexler, PracticingLaw for PoorPeople,
79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970) (discussing client-group conflict of interest).

